Long distance migration is a widespread process evolved independently in several animal groups in terrestrial 2 and marine ecosystems. Many factors contribute to the migration process and of primary importance are intra-specific 4 competition and seasonality in the resource distribution. Adaptive migration in direction of increasing fitness should leads 6 to the ideal free distribution (IFD) which is the evolutionary stable strategy of the habitat selection game. We introduce a 8 migration game which focuses on migrating dynamics that lead to the IFD for age-structured populations in time vary-10 ing environments where dispersal is costly. The model assumes a network of habitats and predicts migration dynam-12 ics between these habitats and the corresponding population distribution. When applied to Atlantic bluefin tunas it pre-14 dicts their migration routes and their seasonal distribution. The largest biomass is located in the spawning areas which 16 have also the largest diversity in the age-structure. Distant feeding areas are occupied on a seasonal base and often by 18 larger individuals, in agreement with empirical observation. Moreover we show that only a selected number of migratory 20 routes emerge as those effectively used by tunas.
For example, migratory species such as the Atlantic bluefin tuna (BFT) have widely separated feeding and spawning 36 areas that are distributed over a large latitudinal gradient. Those habitats are typically exposed to changes in seasonal-38 ity and habitat productivity that can affect payoffs and dispersal dynamics of the habitat selection game. The species 40 appears to have evolved a migration strategy that alternates rapid movement between neighbouring regions, to periods 42 of continuous feeding in those areas before a new migration occurs (Block et al, 2005 (Block et al, , 2001 Wilson et al, 2005) . Thus, 44 the dispersal dynamic between distant habitats appears as a multiple step process by which tunas explore several habi-46 tats rather than a single direct movement towards higher payoff areas. 48 In this manuscript we present a game theoretical approach, called the "migration game", to model migration dynamics 50 of an age-structured population on a network of interconnecting habitats that undergo seasonal variation. In addition, 52 we assume a travel cost that is age specific. Then we apply this concept to BFT to predict their seasonal distribution and 54 their migration routes across the Atlantic.
2 Theoretical framework 56 2.1 The migration game
We consider an unstructured migratory species in an hetero-58 geneous environment consisting of a network with n habitats. Population and distributional processes are assumed to 60 be discrete in time, and the time step is scaled so that it equals 1. In each habitat, i, and at each time step the popula-62 tion abundance, p i , changes due to migration and population dynamics:
where f i is the demographic change of the population p i (birth and death processes), and x i j (t) is the per capita 66 migration rate from patch i to patch j within the unit time interval. The model (Eq. 1) assumes that in each time inter-68 val dispersal occurs before demographic changes. The total population abundance at time t is P(t) = ∑ n i p i (t). Dispersal 70 rates, x i j (t), are non-negative and satisfy ∑ n j=1 x i j (t) = 1 for every i = 1, . . . , n. We note that x ii (t) is the probability of 72 staying in the patch i.
To describe migration rates we assume that each habitat 74 is characterised by a negative density dependent payoff, u i . If there is a direct link between habitats i and j in the net-76 work, then for individuals migrating from i to j we define a reward function:
where c i j ≥ 0 is a cost term for the migration game. This cost includes the energy needed to migrate between habitats 80 i and j as well as the energy required for habitat selection and decision making processes (Bonte et al, 2012) . 82 We consider directed (non-random) movements on the network and we assume that along the migration routes the reward must be non-negative. In other words, an individual currently in patch i will move to patch j only when the reward of doing so is positive. Hence at each time step, t, dispersal rates x i j must results in a population distribution satisfying:
In the model motility is restricted by the topology of the network and individuals can only migrate between neigh-84 bouring habitats (i.e., habitats directly connected by a link). Moreover, the choice of an individual affects migration rates,
x i j , and also population distribution (p i , Eq. 1). Hence, the rewards (Φ i j , Eq. 2) are regulated by the reciprocal strate-2 gies of competing individuals. This defines a non cooperative migration game, in which 4 (1) players are the set of individuals characterised by their current habitat i, (2) the strategy of the players currently 6 in habitat i is the probability x i j with which the individuals move to one of the neighbouring habitats, and (3) the reward 8 of the set of players living in i is defined as the average reward ∑ j x i j Φ i j where the sum is only over all neighbouring habitats j (i.e., habitats directly connected to habitat i).
The equilibrium solutions are migration rates x * i j that are 12 the Nash equilibria (NE) of the migration game. The equilibrium strategy is such that any unilateral change in the strat-14 egy of any individual would results in a lower reward for the player who changes its strategy. This implies that for any 16 two habitats j and j such that x * i j > 0 and x * i j > 0, the rewards must be the same and maximal (i.e.,
for any connected habitat k such that x ik = 0). The migration game is a potential game that guarantees the existence 20 and uniqueness of a NE (Sandholm, 2010) . This equilibrium can be calculated as the solution of a variational inequal-22 ity (Nagurney, 1993; Mullon and Nagurney, 2012; Nagurney et al, 1992) dividuals reach a local IFD in the sense that directly linked patches have the same payoffs as we do not consider the 42 cost of dispersal. As time increases, the IFD becomes more global, that is, payoffs in additional patches get equalised.
44
To illustrate the relation between migration equilibrium and distributional equilibrium we consider a simple case of 46 three habitats denoted as A, B, C, and two different network topologies: (a) a fully connected network ( Figure 1a ); (b) a 48 network where B is disconnected from C (Figure 1b ). Each habitat is characterised by its payoff:
where K i is the habitat environmental carrying capacity, p i is the number of individuals in patch i with i ∈ {A, B,C}. We 52 assume no migration costs (c i j = 0) and all individuals, P, initially occupying habitat C only, i.e., p C = P, p A = p B = 0.
54
When the network is fully connected our model converges to the IFD in a single time step (Figure 1a ). Since 56 individuals are free to move in all the habitats in the network, the strategies resulting from the migration game are 58 those needed to balance the reward function in Eq.
(2) for all the three habitats. This condition is also the condition for 60 the IFD.
When the network is not fully connected, several steps 62 are needed to reach the IFD (Figure 1b ). The equilibrium value can be efficiently calculated using variational inequal-64 ity (Mullon, 2013) . In the first step, only movements between C and A are possible on the network and the values 66 of x i j are those balancing the rewards (Φ CA = Φ AC ), i.e., a local IFD conditions is reached between the two habitats.
68
In the next step, individuals that are now in habitat A have the possibility to migrate into B since Φ AB > 0. But, not 70 all the dispersal rates are possible to reach the equilibrium, since for any given habitat the number of migrants cannot be 72 larger than the number of inhabitants. Indeed, the migration equilibrium x AB , x CA must satisfy constraints 0 ≤ x AB ≤ p A 74 and 0 ≤ x CA ≤ p C . The new distribution is again calculated equalising the reward functions in the three habitats and con-76 sidering that after the migration the payoff in habitat A can be written as
with similar expressions for the payoff in habitat B and C. Equilibrium values for x CA and x AB are calculated by equal-80 ising the patch payoffs. In particular, at this step all the individuals living in A move into B and a new distribution is 82 reached between A and C. At step number three, the equilibrium values for dispersal rates are those satisfying the IFD 84 on the network (Figure 1b ).
The effects of costs and multiple equilibria 86
When travel costs are zero and patch payoffs are negative density dependent there is a single IFD (Křivan et al, 2008) .
88
However, if migration costs are positive there may be infinitely many possible IFDs. Indeed, let us consider an en-90 vironment consisting of two habitats (i = 1, 2), and let the habitat payoffs be described by the Eq. (4).
92
The reward of an individual currently in patch 1 to migrate to patch 2 is and, similarly, the reward of an individual currently in patch 2 to migrate to patch 1 is
Under the IFD none of these two rewards can be positive.
In particular, when travel costs are neglected a single IFD 2 exists at which Φ 12 (p 1 , p 2 ) = Φ 21 (p 1 , p 2 ) = 0 ( Figure 2A ). When travel costs are positive ( Figure 2B ) there is a region The LCP method that we use to calculate numerically 8 the NE of the migration game selects a single IFD from the set of possible IFDs, The selected point is on the boundary of the set of all IFDs, i.e., in the above example it is one of the two boundary points. 
Coupling migration and demographic processes
We extend the model (Eq. 1, 2) by considering a structured 14 population with several (S) age classes a. It can be represented as P i (t) → P i (t) → P i (t + 1), where P i (t) = {p i,a } 16 is the population distribution, once individuals have redistributed themselves according to the migration equilibrium, 18 and P i (t + 1) is the population distribution after the demographic processes (birth, death and growth). To represent 20 these processes, in each habitat, we use a Leslie matrix, i.e., we have P
The probability that a fish in class a − 1 at time t will grow into class a at time t + 1 is g a . Similarly, q a is the probability 24 that a fish will continue to stay in the same class, while r a is the average number of newborns (belonging to the class 26 a = 1) produced by individuals at ages a > 1. to allow the species to benefit from large biomasses of prey species in these regions (Cury et al, 1998) . 
Case Study

Model implementation
We implement the theoretical framework described above, Habitats are defined within a certain spatial range (grey areas) for which we calculate the average biological productivity which is assumed proportional to the habitat's carrying capacity. Links between habitats indicates the potential migration routes assumed in the present study.
Patch payoffs for an individual of class a in habitat i ∈ {A, ..., H} at month t are density dependent:
where p i,a is the population of age a living in habitat i; K i is the time varying carrying capacity of habitat i described 8 as K i (t) = K i (1 − θ i cos(tπ/2)), with θ i ≤ 1, being a seasonality parameter specific for each habitat ( Table 2) 
where d i j is the distance in kilometres between habitat i and 28 j, while w a is the age specific average weight, which we assume is proportional to the individual swimming speed.
30
We consider migrations performed at an optimal velocity and it can be shown (Appendix A) that for tunas the swim-32 ming speed scales as w 0.06 a (Ware, 1978) . We set the range of µ = 5 − 150 to analyse migration game under different habi-34 tat selection costs, and we test the sensitivity of our results to this parameter. 36 The demographic rates in the Leslie matrix (survival q a , fertility r a , growth g a ; Eq. 6) are given in Table 1 We first run the model using only the demographic processes, without migration or environmental variability, and set the total bluefin tuna biomass (M = 330 kton). The simulation converges towards a stable age-structure distri-2 bution in the spawning areas (Gulf of Mexico and Mediterranean) and zero biomass otherwise. This is the initial con-4 dition used in all the subsequent simulations.
From this initial distribution, we simulate the migration 6 game in the case of a stable environment with no seasonality (K i constant, Table 2 ). We assume no demographic changes 8 in the tuna population structure (i.e., the Leslie matrix is the identity matrix) but consider different costs in the habi- Brazil ( Figure 5B ) are occupied by the larger/older classes, but have the lowest of the biomasses. The age-structure in 2 each habitat changes less than the variability in total biomass, but throughout the season significant changes in the agestructure can occur in the eastern Atlantic and Maine ( Figure  5C,G) . Interestingly the peaks in biomass in the spawning 6 areas are in April -May while in the feeding areas are in July -August and late October in Brazil ( Figure 5 ) as it is 8 commonly reported (Table 4 .2). The intensity of migration on the habitat network depends on the cost of the habitat selection process and the spawning intensity of the species (Figure 6 ). When costs are 12 low and spawning intensity high ( Figure 6a ) the population distributes in all available habitats and all migratory routes 14 are used with the exception of the transatlantic route C -G. The age-structure is different in each area and highly di-16 versified in the spawning area and in the central Atlantic.
When the spawning intensity is reduced ( Figure 6b ) the to-18 tal global biomass also decreases and some of the routes are used less frequently. In particular the connections between 20
Brazil and the western Atlantic are much weaker but the transatlantic connections (A -G and C -G) have higher mi-22 gration flows.This is mainly driven by the very low biomass living in the habitat in Brazil (Figure 6b ) . At higher habitat 24 selection costs (Figure 6c,d) the direct transatlantic routes connecting habitats A and C to G break down and generally 26 there are low migration rates between habitats. Moreover, only larger individuals appear to exploit the farthest habi-28 tats B and E. Further increases of the costs, results in the majority of the population staying in the spawning habitats.
In these configurations habitats such as Brazil and Norway have a very low biomass or are completely unoccupied. In 32 the case of high cost and low spawning intensity the migration strategy is only selected by larger individuals while 34 the majority of the population will not distribute outside the spawning grounds. Most of these patterns are confirmed 36 also when a more extensive sensitivity analyses is performed (Appendix A.3).
38 5 Discussions
Migration modelling 40
We introduce a model based on game theory to simulate habitat selection processes in migratory populations. The 42 model is developed to describe migration dynamics in agestructured fish populations and it is applied to study the sea- population distributions in the habitats. We further show that only some subset of the available links on the network are 52 effectively selected as migratory pathways while many other routes are not utilised. This allows us to identify emerging 54 migration routes in fish populations and to compare the predictions with observed migration behaviour.
56
A fundamental assumption in the model is that migration is described as a multiple equilibrium process between 58 different habitats. In the migration game, each individual in a given habitat can -in a single time step -move only to 60 the neighbour habitats, i.e., those that are locally connected to the one where the individual is living. The migration oc-62 curs when there is an advantage to move, which in the model is described as a positive reward function. Since this func-64 tion is negatively density dependent, its value is affected by the strategies of other individuals in the populations and it , 2002; Rijnsdorp et al, 2009; Doney et al, 2012) .
The ability to equalise the local reward functions and 24 reach an equilibrium is consistent with the ideal free distribution theory (Fretwell and Lucas, 1969) . We show that 26 at each time step individuals in the population distribute according to a local IFD among connected habitats and, in case 28 of stable environment with no demographic effects, the local equilibrium converges, in several steps, towards a global 30 IFD on the network (Pan and Nagurney, 1994; Cressman and Křivan, 2006) . The behaviour dynamic we use in the model 32 describes when and how individuals update their strategies over time. This is known as revision protocol in game the-34 ory (Sandholm, 2010) and is based on two assumptions: myopia and inertia. A myopic behaviour means that individu-36 als assess their strategy based on local information on costs and payoff opportunities, without incorporating knowledge 38 on future expectations and behaviours. Inertia in behaviour considers that individuals do not update their strategy con-tinuously but instead re-evaluate their decision sporadically, mainly because very often the environment in which they 2 live provides a multiplicity of concerns to be solved rather than a single-minded focus on one strategy (Sandholm, 2010) . 4 We think that the discrete form of time and space in our model describes naturally myopic and inertial processes which and migration stopovers which are typically found in many species (Rose, 1993; Hunter et al, 2003) . As we have seen before, Atlantic bluefin tunas have a wide distribution in the Atlantic Ocean from tropical to sub-polar 54 areas. Migration has likely evolved to allow migrants to benefit from the highly productive environment at higher lat- The modelled estimate of the timing of appearance at 82 summer feeding areas is similar to the migration phenology to many of these areas observed in nature ( The time needed to migrate between two habitats regulates the cost of migration in fish population since the energy consumed will be higher 4 the longer is the migration time. The power rate consumed while swimming at an optimal speed (P) is:
where w is the weight of the fish, while the allometric constants α 0 and η have been estimated for fish swimming at high Reynolds number 8 (Ware, 1978, Table 4 ).
We can fairly assume that migrations is performed at an optimal swimming speed (U * ) at which the total energy expenditure per unit distance is minimised. Using an allometric function for the metabolic 12 costs M = α 1 w γ , a general form of U * can be derived by an optimisation procedure relating the swimming cost to the total cost of moving 14 (metabolic cost plus power output):
where α 1 and γ are allometric constants for fish metabolism (Ta-16 ble 4). This results in an allometric scaling for the optimal swimming speed as:
In tuna the exponent β has been found to range between 1.4 < β < 2.8 (Dewar and Graham, 1994) and we assume β = 2.1, which provides 20 swimming speeds in the range reported for several tuna species (1.2 − 2.4BLs −1 ) (Block and Stevens, 2001).
22
Thus we obtain a scaling U * ≈ w 0.06 .
A.2 Demography
24
Large uncertainties exist on the definition of demographic parameters for the bluefin tuna population (Simon et al, 2012 ). In our model, the 26 young-of-the-year stage ( 0 -1 years) is excluding egg phases and does not have reproductive potential while at juvenile stage (1 -5 years) a 28 small fraction is mature for reproduction. The reproductive maturity increases up to 50% at the adult stage (5 -10 years) while mature (10 30 -20) and old (20 -35) stages are fully reproductive but the latter has a lower survival rate. Those rates are consistent with observed matu-32 rity at age data for western and eastern atlantic bluefin tuna (SCRS, 2012) and are used to define the values of r k . Moreover, the value sur-34 vival (q) and growth (g) values used in the Leslie matrix are consistent with reported values for the yearly mortality rates (SCRS, 2012) and 36 provide a realistic bluefin tuna age-structure ( Fig. 7) with a maximum population growth rate (0.15) that is in the range of previous estimates 38 (Simon et al, 2012) . Finally, we constrain the global bluefin tuna population using a given total carrying capacity K t and assume a density 40 dependent function on the spawning factor s.
A.3 Extended Sensitivity analyses 42
At low spawning intensity and high migration costs (Figure 8g ) only the spawning areas are occupied. Decreasing habitat selection costs 44 allows tuna to migrate in adjacent feeding areas (G and C) but reduce the total biomass and increase fluctuations in the migration behaviour 46 (Figure 8a,d) . On the other hand, at high spawning and low migration costs (Figure 8a,b) the biomass reaches the total carrying capacity over 48 few months, and all habitats are occupied although at different levels of biomass. Fig. 8 Sensitivity of the population structure and total biomass in different habitats in case of no seasonality and zero fishing under different spawning intensity s and habitat selection cost µ.
